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Abstract 
We propose an integration of possibility the­
ory into non-classical logics. We obtain many 
formal results that generalize the case where 
possibility and necessity functions are based 
on classical logic. We show how useful such 
an approach is by applying it to reasoning un­
der uncertain and inconsistent information. 
1 Introduction 
Possibility theory has been widely used in Artificial In­
telligence to represent uncertain knowledge in a more 
qualitative way than, for example, probability theory: 
indeed, it is equivalent to work with "quantitative" 
possibility theory (which means using possibility and 
necessity measures and possibility distributions, which 
map formulas or worlds to [0, 1]) or with its qualitative 
counterpart (where qualitative necessity and possibil­
ity relations are preorders on the logical language and 
qualitative possibility distributions are just preorders 
on the set of worlds). Besides, its connection to vari­
ous qualitative formalisms in logic and Artificial Intel­
ligence has been established, notably with epistemic 
entrenchment relations in [DP 9la], conditional logics 
in [Bou 92] [FHL 94], System Z in [BDP 92]. The use of 
possibility theory in Artificial Intelligence covers non­
monotonic reasoning [DP 91b], belief revision, incon­
sistency handling, inheritance and default rules han­
dling, temporal reasoning, constraint satisfaction, . . . 
In Knowledge Representation, many non-classical log­
ics have been used (note that in this paper we consider 
only non-classical logics sharing the same language as 
classical logic). Each of them was intended for some 
particular focus, a specific aspect of reasoning: E.g. 
paraconsistent logics have been used to deal with con­
tradictory knowledge bases. Or, intuitionistic logic has 
been used to take into account some subtle distinctions 
between statements involving double negation for ex­
ample. Or, Kleene's 3-valued logic {and other many­
valued logics) has been used to cope with statements 
for which neither truth nor falsity make sense. 
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Now, possibility theory brings in something more that 
should be fruitfully exploited as complementary to 
such aspects of reasoning. Hence, we study how to 
integrate possibility theory with non-classical logics. 
Our work comes from the following two facts: 
• even when the involved uncertainty has a possi­
bilistic nature, "classical" possibility theory may 
not be well-suited to the addressed problem, due 
to shortcomings, not of possibility theory itself 
but of classical logic, on which possibility theory 
is defined. For example, some problems require a 
formalization with a local view of inconsistency: 
this is impossible with classical possibility theory 
(we need a paraconsistent approach, cfSection 3). 
• on the ot.her hand, non-standard logics such as 
intuitionistic logic, paraconsistent logics,. . . are 
not expressive enough to express uncertainty in 
a gradual way. 
These arguments show that it is generally valuable to 
integrate non-classical logics with a numerical theory 
of uncertainty. Now, the reason why we focus in this 
paper on possibility theory rather than another theory 
of uncertainty, is its qualitative nature (as it amounts 
to a "numerical account" of preordering relations over 
formulas or worlds), which should make it a priori sim­
pler to generalize than more quantitative approaches 
such as probability theory or belief functions. 
The methodology we follow in this paper consists of 
going from the general case to the particular case: 
• in Section 2, we investigate whether, and under 
which conditions, important properties of possi­
bility theory remain valid when generalized. We 
state the results in the most general case to make 
the study "reusable", though the applications de­
veloped in Section 3 focus on paraconsistency. 
• in Section 3, we take a case study, that is, we 
choose a paraconsistent logic (namely Ct) and dis­
cuss more practical applications to reasoning with 
uncertain and inconsistent information. 
*Research supported by CNRS in project "Gestion de 
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2 Non-classical necessity and 
possibility functions 
2.1 Necessity /possibility functions 
The natural presentation of necessity and possibility 
functions (see [Zad 78] for instance) shows that pos­
sibility theory consists in meta-level definitions over 
classical logic, which respect completely the structure 
of classical logic. 
This suggests that similar functions could be defined 
on other logics than classical logic; so, replacing (.C,I-) 
by (.C, f---L) where L is a given non-classical logic, we can 
look for a definition of possibility /necessity functions 
on the logic L. We deal with classical propositional1 
languages, built from a list of propositional variables 
- sometimes required to be finite -, and the connec­
tives -., 1\, V, �, <-> (where 1-L 9 <--> t/; is a shorthand 
for 1-L 9 -+ t/; and 1-L t/; -+ ¥' ) .  The only vary­
ing parameter is then the consequence relation f-L. 
We now give a generic definition of non-classical ne­
cessity /possibility functions, of which the usual ne­
cessity /possibility functions correspond to the special 
case where L is classical logic (Section 3 deals with the 
special case where L is the paraconsistent logic Cr). 
Definition: let .C be a classical propositional language 
and 1-L a consequence relation, L being a given (maybe 
non-classical) logic. A L-necessity function is a map­
ping N from .C to [0, 1] satisfying the following axioms2 
(Taut) if f-- L 9 then N (9) = 1 
(Eq) if 1-L 9 <--> t/; then N('P) = N(t/;) 
(Conj) N(¥' 1\ t/;) = min(N(¥'), N(t/;)) 
When L is classical logic, we recover the classical ne­
cessity functions. Whatever the logic L is, the follow­
ing property always entails (Eq): 
(Dom) if f---L 'P-+ t/; then N('P)::; N(t/;) 
Proposition 1: (Dom) is entailed by (Eq) and (Conj) 
on condition that l-L satisfies: 
f-L\;'�1/J 
Hence, for all logics L fulfilling the latter condition, a 
necessity function can then be characterized as a func­
tion N: .C----> [0, 1] satisfying (Taut), (Conj), (Dom). 
1 For the sake of simplicity, we consider only the propo­
sitional level throughout the paper. 
2Many definitions of necessity functions include the ex­
tra axiom ( Contr) if f- •<p then N ( <p) = 0 but not all: 
for example, in [DLP 94] the quantity N{) > 0, reflects 
a degree of (partial) inconsistency. Note that requiring 
(Contr) or not -and the same for (Taut)- does not make 
much difference since (Dam) ensures that contradictions 
(resp. tautologies) have anyway the lowest (resp. highest) 
necessity degree. Now, the reason why we require (Taut) 
and not ( Contr) concerns the characterization of necessity 
functions in terms of possibility distributions. 
The dual functions of necessity functions are called 
possibility functions. They can be defined by 3 axioms 
about contradiction, equivalence and disjunction: 
Definition: A L-possibility function is a mapping II 
from C to [0, 1] such that 
(Contr) if 1-L •({) then II(¥=')= 0 
(Eqn) if l-L 9 +-+ t/; then II(If') = II(t/;) 
(Disj) II(9 V ¢) = max(II(If'), II(t/;)) 
Whatever the logic L, the next property entails (Eqn): 
(Domn) iff-L 9--+ t/; then II('P)::; II(t/;) 
Proposition 2: (Domrr) is entailed by (Eqrr) and 
(Disj) on condition that f-L satisfies: 
1-L (/)-+ '1/J 
2.2 Some properties of non-classical 
necessity /possibility functions 
When L is classical logic, (L-)possibility functions can 
be defined from (L-)necessity functions by means of 
\lip E £, ll(lf') = 1- N(...,r.p) and (L-)necessity func­
tions can be defined from (L-)possibility functions by 
V'(J E .C,N(¥') = 1-II(-.¥')· That is, "classical" neces­
sity and possibility functions enjoy the (double) dual­
ity property: 
(Dl} II is a possibility function iff dn : £ -+ [0, 1] 
defined by drr ( r.p) = 1 -II ( -,'P) is a necessity func­
tion. 
(D2) N is a necessity function iff dN : C -+ [0, 1] de­
fined by dN(9) = 1- N(-.9) is a possibility func­
tion. 
Some questions we may ask are: how can (D1) and 
(D2) carry over to L-necessity and L-possibility func­
tions? When are (Dl) and (D2) equivalent? 
Proposition 3: if 1-L -.-.r.p <-->¥' then (D1) {::} (D2). 
Proposition 4: if L satisfies 
1. 1-L r.p +-+ ...,-,'(J 
2. 1-L -.(91\ t/;) � (-.9 V -.'ljJ) 
3. f-L -.( tp V '1/J) � ( -.r.p 1\ -,.,p) 
and the following inference rules 
1-L(/) 1-Llp-+tj; f---L({)--"1/J 
j-L '1/J 1-L -.'ljJ -+ -.r.p 
then (D1) and (D2) hold. 
Note that among non-classical logics admitting (1)-(3) 
and the above two inference rules (modus ponens and 
contraposition), there are various relevant logics such 
as the logic E [AB 75]. Let us now have a look on 
necessary conditions for having (D1) (or (D2)). 
Proposition 5: if there exists 9 such that f-L r.p and 
If L -.-.r.p then (Dl) does not hold. 
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Proposition 6: if there exists I{) such that r L --,---,1{) 
and lfL 1p then (D2) does not hold. 
Next, we investigate a few issues related to the con­
dition under which a function from C to [0, 1] can be 
both a necessity and a possibility function. 
Definition: a truth-functional valuation is a func­
tion f from C to [0, 1] such that there exist two non­
decreasing operators EB and® from (0, 1]2 to (0, 1] such 
that 'V1p, t/J, f('P V t/J) = f(cp) ffi f(t/J) and /('P 1\ t/J) = 
f(cp) 0 f(,P). 
Definition: a logic L is said to admit trivialisation 
of truth-functional valuations iff any truth-functional 
valuation f satisfying (Dom), i.e. f-L 1p -+ t/J implies 
f( 1p) � f( t/J) (we will also say that f is monotonic 
w.r.t. 1-L) is a classical valuation, i.e. there are two 
values O" and 1* such that Vip,/(IP) E {o•,l*} and 
f(-.IP) f= f(IP)-
It is well-known that trivialisation of truth-functional 
valuations holds in the case of classical propositional 
logic ([Wes 87] (DP 88] - see also [DP 94] for a discus­
sion on the implications of this result). To study the 
condition under which this property also holds in the 
case of non-classical logics, Jet us consider the follow­
ing assumptions: 
1. 'r-Lip-+ipVt/J 
2. f-.LI{)I\1/J-1{) 
3. f-L 'P 1\ 'P +->I{) 
4. 'r-L I{) V cp +->I{) 
5. 'r L 'P 1\ '1j; +-+ '1j; 1\ 'P 
6. f-. L cp V 1/J +-> t/J V cp 
7. 'r-L (cpl\t/J)I\� +-+cpi\(1/J/\0 
8. 'rL('P Vt/J)Y�+-+cp V(t/JY�) 
9. f-. L cp V -.cp (excluded middle) 
10. f-.L -.(cp/\-.cp) (non-contradiction) 
Again, an example of a logic satisfying these properties 
is the logic E [AB 75]. On the other hand, intuitionistic 
logic and paraconsistent logics do not. 
Proposition 7: let L be a logic satisfying (1) to (8) 
and f a truth-functional valuation monotonic w .r .t. 
f-L. Then we have ffi = max and ® = min. 
Proposition 8: let L be a logic satisfying (1) to (8) 
and excluded middle, and f a truth-functional valua­
tion on L monotonic w.r.t. f-.L· Then, Vcp,f(<p) = 1* 
or f(-,cp) = 1•, where 1• = sup{/('P) , cp E C}. 
Proposition 9: let L be a logic satisfying (1)-(8) and 
non-contradiction and f a truth-functional valuation 
monotonic w.r.t. 1-£. Then Vcp,/(cp) = 0* or f(-,IP) = 
o• where 0* = inf{f(cp),ip E £}. 
Corollary 10: any logic satisfying (1) to {8), excluded 
middle and non-contradiction admits trivialisation of 
truth-functional valuations. 
2.3 Semantics of L-necessity /possibility 
functions 
With the assumption that C is built from a finite 
number of propositional variables, "classical " neces­
sity /possibility functions can be semantically defined 
by means of possibility distributions: a possibility dis­
tribution 7r is simply a function from the set n of all in­
terpretations for L to (0, 1]. The necessity function in­
duced by 1r is defined by N ( 'P) = inf{1-7r(w) /w f= ''P} 
(with the convention inf 0 = 1 that we take in all  the 
paper as well as sup 0 = 0). It can then be proved 
that N is a necessity measure, and that any necessity 
measure is induced by a possibility distribution. 
We now turn to the general case of a logic L for which 
the class of L-models is written nL. 
Definition: a L-possibility distribution is a mapping 
1r from �h to [0, 1] . It is said to be normalized iff 
supv E:i1L 7r(v) = 1. 
In classical logic, due to the equivalence between v li: 'P 
and v f= -.cp, the two following definitions for inducing 
a C-necessity function from a C-possibility distribution 
are equivalent: 
N(cp) 1- sup{1r(v)/v li: cp} 
N(cp) 1- sup{7r(v)/v F ''P} 
Analogously, for possibitity functions: 
II(cp) sup{7r(v)/v � 'P} 
ll(cp) = sup{7r(v)/v f= ''P} 
Definition: JI{1r), /2{1r), /a(7r), /4(1r) are the map­
pings from ,C to (0, 1] induced from 1r by: 
ft(7r)(cp) 
f2(7r)(cp) 
/a(7r)('P) 
/4(7r)(cp) 
= 1- sup{7r(v)/v �L cp} 
1- sup{7r(v)lv FL •'P} 
sup{1r(v)/v FL cp} 
::: sup { 1r( v) I v � L -.cp} 
It is straightforward from these definitions that the 
following duality properties hold: 
• /4(7r)('P) = 1- ft(7r)(-,cp) 
• f2(7r){'P) = 1- fa(7r)(•cp) 
Proposition 11: if L is such that v !i=L cp =? v FL 
-.cp (or equi valent1y, v � L ''P =? v f= L 'P )3 then 
/2(1r)(cp) � fl(7r)(cp), and /4(1r)(cp) � /3(1r)(cp). 
Proposition 12: ft is a L-necessity function, pro­
vided that the following conditions hold: 
• if f-L cp then v FL cp for all v (Soundness) 
• V F L 'P +-+ t/J iff ( V F L 'P) {::> ( V F tj;) 
• V F L 'P 1\ 1/J iff V F L I{) and V F L 1/J 
3Either (v �L cp =? v I=L -.cp) or (v �L •cp =? v FL cp) 
basically amounts to the validity of cp V •cp in the logic L. 
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Proposition 13: h is a 1-necessity function, pro­
vided that the following conditions hold: 
• if I-L rp then v � L -.rp for all v 
• v FL rp <c-t 1/; iff (v FL -.rp) <:? (v FL -.'lj;) 
• v FL -.(rp 1\ '1/J) iff v FL -.rp or v FL -.tf 
Proposition 14: h is a 1-possibility function, pro­
vided that the following conditions hold: 
• if I-L cp then v � L -.rp for all v 
• v FL rp <c-t 1/; iff (v FL 'P) <:? (v FL '1/J) 
• v F= L rp V '1/J iff v F= L cp or v F= L tP 
Proposition 15: J4 is a 1-possibility function, pro­
vided that the following conditions hold: 
• if I-L rp then v f= L 'P for all v (Soundness) 
• v FL 'P <c-t 1/; iff (v FL -.'P) <:? (v FL -,'lj;) 
• v FL --.(cp V tf) iff v FL ''P and v FL •1/; 
2.4 L-necessity orderings 
It has been shown [Dub 86] that necessity and possi­
bility functions can be equivalently expressed in purely 
qualitative terms, with preordering relations. We 
briefly give a generalization of this result, for the case 
of necessities (the case for possibilities is similar). 
Definition: A 1-necessity ordering is a relation on .C 
satisfying the following properties: 
• if rp 2:: 1/; and 1/; 2:: � then rp 2:: � (transitivity) 
• if I-L 'P -+ '1/J then 1/; 2:: rp (dominance) 
• rp 1\ tP � rp or rp 1\ tjJ � '1/J (conjunctiveness) 
Definition [Dub 86]: a relation 2:: on C is said to 
agree strictly with a mapping f from C to [0, 1] iff 
Vrp, 1/; E .C, we have 'P 2:: tP <:? !( rp) 2:: f( '1/J ). 
Proposition 16 (correspondence between 1-necessity 
functions and 1-necessity orderings): the only map­
pings from .C to [0, 1] agreeing strictly with 1-necessity 
orderings and also satisfying (Taut) are 1-necessity 
functions. 
3 Application to reasoning with 
uncertain and inconsistent 
information 
3.1 Motivations 
Possibility theory, as well as its qualitative counter­
parts such as epistemic entrenchment relations [GM 
88], ranked knowledge bases [Pea 90] or rational clo­
sure [1eh 89] provide a relativized treatment of incon­
sistency, since the latter becomes a gradual notion. 
I.e., a possibilistic knowledge base [D1P 94] consists 
of a set of constraints KB = {(cp; ai),i = l..n}, where 
( cp; a;) is a syntactic notation for the semantical con­
straint N ( rp;) 2:: a;. 
A possibilistic knowledge base is partially inconsis­
tent if it leads to enforce N(.l) > 0; stated oth­
erwise, the inconsistency degree of K B is defined 
by Incons(KB) = maxs£;KB,S�l_ min(<p;a,)es a; = 
min{N(.l), N satisfies KB}. Any formula below this 
level, i.e. any rp; where a;:::; Incons(KB), is then in­
hibited (it is "drown" by the inconsistency [BCD1P 
93]). This shows that the notion of inconsistency 
in possibilistic logic and its qualitative counterpart is 
gradual but global. The inconsistency level measures 
to what extent the knowledge base is inconsistent, but 
do not locate the inconsistency. The aforementioned 
"drowning effect" is a consequence of this global treat­
ment of inconsistency. One way to cope with it is 
to consider the knowledge base syntactically [Bre 89] 
[Neb 91] [BCD1P 93], by selecting among maximal 
sub-bases of KB using a criterion involving the a;'s. 
However, these syntactical approaches do not have 
(yet) any semantics in terms of uncertainty measures. 
Now, using paraconsistent logics for handling incon­
sistent knowledge bases enables a local treatment of 
inconsistency, by locating the inconsistency on some 
formulas. Yet, these paraconsistent approaches do not 
allow for any graduality in the inconsistency, which im­
plies some loss of information if the initial knowledge 
was pertained with uncertainty. 
While possibilistic logic allows for a gradual but global 
treatment of inconsistency, where conflicts are solved 
only by comparing the uncertainty level of the pieces of 
information with the inconsistency level of the knowl­
edge base, the pure paraconsistent approach localizes 
inconsistency, but conflicts cannot be ranked accord­
ing to uncertainty, importance, priority, normality as 
done in rank-based systems. Thus paraconsistency is 
not able to "solve" the conflicts. What we propose 
here is to apply the results of Section 2 to a given 
paraconsistent logic, namely C1 [daC 74], to handle 
both uncertain and inconsistent knowledge, and with 
a local treatment of inconsistency. We now give two 
motivating examples, one about fusion of uncertain 
information (multi-source reasoning) and one about 
reasoning with default rules. 
Example 1 (multi�source reasoning) 
This example is borrowed from [Cho 94]. 
Two witnesses report their observations about a mur­
derer. Witness 1 (noted W1) is certain that the mur­
derer was a woman with blond hair, and believes (with 
some uncertainty) that she was wearing a Chanel suit, 
glasses, and was driving a BMW. Witness 2 (noted 
W2) is certain that the murderer was a woman with 
brown hair and that she was not wearing glasses, and 
believes (with some uncertainty) that she was driving 
a Fiat. 
W1 female (sure), blond-hair (sure), drives-BMW 
(unsure), wear-glasses (unsure), wear-Chanel­
sui t (unsure) 
W2 female (sure), brown-hair (sure), drives-Fiat 
(unsure), •wear-glasses (sure) 
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What would we like to conclude about the following 
statements? 
• Both witnesses agree that the murderer was fe­
male and are completely sure; so we want to con­
clude the murderer was female. 
• No contradiction either about wear-Chanel-suit 
since witness 2 does not know anything. 
• Strong contradiction about the colour of the mur­
derer's hair; we wish to conclude neither blond 
nor brown but we want to keep in mind that 
these literals are "strongly subject to inconsis­
tency" (knowing the constraint •(blond-hair 1\ 
brown-hair)). 
• Contradiction about wear-glasses: the contradic­
tion is weaker than the one above since witness 1 
is unsure; moreover, since witness 2's information 
is prioritary to witness 1 's we would like to solve 
the conflict (by concluding •wear-glasses). 
• Weak contradiction again, about the car; however, 
since both witnesses are equally certain, we do not 
want to conclude anything. 
Example 2 (drowning effect) 
Here, applying Pearl's ranking procedure of default 
rules to 
.6. = {penguin ......,. bird, penguin ----> •fly, 
bird ___. fly, bird ___. wings} 
g1ves 
.6. 1 = {penguin ......,. bird, penguin ---> •fly}; 
.6.0 = {bird ---. fly, bird ---+ wings}. 
Adding the fact penguin to .6. enables us to infer •fly 
but wings is not deduced (it is "drown" by the incon­
sistency appearing at rank 1). This particular case of 
the drowning effect is known as the property of "in­
heritance blocking". 
Considering .6. as a set of formulas for the logic C1, we 
obtain 
AU {penguin} f-c, {fly, •fly, wings}. 
Thus, we avoid the drowning effect but we do not take 
into account priorities (induced by specificity) such as 
penguin ......,. •fly over bird ......,. fly and we conclude 
that fly is not well-behaved. 
What we would like is to take advantage of the lo­
calisation of inconsistency, as done by paraconsistent 
entailment, and the priority between formulas, which 
would lead us to infer {fly, wings} but not •fly. 
Note that prioritized syntax-based approaches based 
on the selection of maximal consistent subsets of the 
knowledge base guided by the priorities solve the 
drowning effect but do not tell anything about where 
the contradictions are localized; so, for instance, the 
conclusion •wear-glasses is not relativised by the 
fact that it is (weakly) subject to inconsistency. 
3.2 A case study: C1-necessity functions 
3.2.1 The paraconsistent logic C1 
C1 [ daC 7 4] is a paraconsistent logic, that is, a logic 
in which a contradiction <p 1\ -,IP fails to entail other 
arbitrary contradictions 1/J 1\ -,'ljJ , cl retains all infer­
ence patterns of classical logic that are not based on 
negation. For instance, 
IP 1/J 
<pi\¢ 
is valid in C1. By contrast, some inference patterns 
of classical logic that do appeal to negation are not 
preserved. For instance, 
'IP •1/J 
-.(<p V 'I/J) 
is not valid in C1. The idea is that positive informa­
tion is fundamental: positive formulas and inferences 
contribute to state what the facts are whereas negative 
formulas and inferences are merely constraints (in the 
sense of integrity constraints for databases). Accord­
ingly, cl allows us to elicit all and only the formulas 
responsible for a given contradiction ([CL 92] (BL 941). 
A valuation-based semantics for C1 (Alv 84] is given 
in Section 3.2.3 as we now reproduce the original ax­
iomatic presentation of C1 that consists of the next 
ten axioms 
1. <p---+(1/J----><p) 
2. (<p----> 1/J)----> [(10---+ (1/J---> u)) ----> (10---+ u)] 
3. \0 1\ 1/J ......,. 'P 
4. \0 1\ 1/J -1/J 
5. <p-->(1/J----><p/\tf;) 
6. <p ---> <p V 7./J 
7. <p---->1/JV<p 
8. (IP----> CT)--> [(1/J----> 0')......,. (<p V tf;---+ 0')] 
9. 'P v --,'P 
10. --,--,1{)-+<p 
together with the single inference rule 'f r .. !f 
C1 has the following basic features. First, the con­
nectives are not interdefinable. For instance, <p V 7./J 
cannot be defined as •( •<p 1\ •7./J). Second, the re­
placement of equivalent formulas does not hold. For 
instance, ( <p v 7./J) +--+ [( <p ---+ 1jJ) ......,. 7./J] is valid in C1 but 
•(<p V 1/J) ......, -.[('P--> 1/J) ---+ 1/J] is not. Third ,  neither 
modus tollens 
•<p 
nor disjunctive syllogism 
\0 v 1/J --,\0 
1/J 
are valid in C1. 
Regarding notation, we use <p0 as an abbreviation for 
--,( <p 1\ •<p). In the next two sections, we also use # to 
denote any of 1\, V, ---+. 
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3.2.2 C1 Mnecessity functions: definition and 
basic properties 
Definition: like for L-necessity functions, replacing 
1--L by 1--c,. 
Some properties enjoyed by C1-necessity functions are: 
Dam: If 1--c, t.p -+  .,P then N(t.p) � N(.,P) 
(P1) N(t.p) = N(•t.p0) or N(•t.p) = N(•t.p0 ) 
(P2) N(.,P);::: min(N(t.p), N(t.p-+ .,P)) 
(P3) 'Pl, ... , 'Pn 1--c, 1/J ::::} N ( 1/J) ;::: min;=l..n N ('Pi) 
(P4) N(-.t.p);::: min(N(t.p0), N(t.p--+ '1/J), N(t.p-+ •if)) 
(P5) N(t.p v '1/J);::: max(N(t.p), N(.,P)) 
(P6) N(-,-,t.p) = N('P) 
(P7) N{t.p00) = 1 
(P8) N(('P#1/J)0) � min(N(t.p0), N(.,P0)) 
(P9) N is a classical necessity function if and only if 
N(t.p0) = 1 for all t.p 
N(-,t.p0) = min(N('P),N(-.t.p)) is the necessity of t.p 
"behaving badly"; it can be seen as a measure of the 
inconsistency inherent in t.p. C1-necessity functions en­
able us to rank the formulas not only with respect to 
their certainty, but also with respect to their inherent 
inconsistency: N( ''Po) gives a notion of inconsistency 
which is both local and gradual. We recover of course 
as particular cases: 
• Classical necessity functions, so that N (''Po) = 
N(.l) for all t.p. The notion of inconsistency is 
still gradual but global. 
• Classical C1-valuations, which verify N(-.t.p0) = 0 
or N(...,t.p") = 1, for all t.p. The notion of inconsis­
tency is still local but not gradual. 
3.2.3 C1-necessity functions: semantics 
At first, a (paraconsistent) Ct-valuation [Alv 84] is a 
mapping from .C to {0, 1} such that: 
• v(t.p) = 0::::} v(..,IP) = 1 
• v(-.-,'P) = 1 {:} v(t.p) = 1 
• v('l/!0) = v(t.p---+ '1/J) = v(tp-+ •1/J) = I::::} v(IP) = 0 
• v(lf' -+ '1/J) = 1 {:} v(lf') = 0 or v(.,P) = 1 
• v(t.p 1\ '1/!) = 1 {::} v(tp) = 1 and v('I/J) ::::= 1 
• v(tpV.,P) = 1 {:} v(lf') = 1 or v('!j!) = 1 
• v(tp0) = v('l/!0) = 1::::} v((!f'#'l/!)0) = 1 
Definition: a C1-possibility distribution is a mapping 
1r from the set of all C1-valuations to [0, 1]. 
Due to Proposition 12, the function fi ( 1r) defined as 
fl(7r)(1;?) = 1- sup{11'(v)\v(1;?) = 0} 
is a Ct-necessity function (since Ct obeys the condi­
tion stated in Proposition 12 - the soundness of the 
semantics coming from the soundness and complete­
ness of C1 established in [Alv 84]). 
We could have also defined C1-possibility functions, 
C1-necessity and possibility orderings, that we do not 
discuss for the sake of brevity. C1-necessity functions 
are sufficient to deal with the next section, devoted to 
the application to reasoning with uncertain and incon­
sistent knowledge. 
3.3 Reasoning with C1 Mnecessity functions 
3.3.1 Generalizing the principle of minimum 
specificity 
The principle of minimum specificity [DP 86] or equiv­
alently, minimum compact ranking [Pea 90] and ratio­
nal closure [Leh 89] (all these being equivalent, up to 
the language on which they are defined) induces, from 
a possibilistic knowledge base, a particular necessity 
function i.e. the smallest among all necessity functions 
satisfying the knowledge base. Thanks to the prop­
erty (P3), we are able to generalize the principle of 
minimum specificity to C1-necessity functions: 
Definition: a C1-possibilistic knowledge base is a fi­
nite set KB = {(tp; a; ) , 1 � i � n} where if'; E .C and 
a; E [0, l]. A C1-necessity function N is said to satisfy 
K B iff Vi = l..n, N( lf'i) ;::: a;. 
Definition: the minimum specificity closure N KB of a 
C1-possibilistic knowledge base K B is the C1-necessity 
function defined by 
Vtj; E .C, Nxs(,P) = sup{,BIKB11I--c1 '1/J} 
where KB13 = {lf';\(!f'; ai) E KB and a;;:=: ,8}. 
Proposition 17 (principle of minimum specificity for 
C1-necessities): For any Ct-necessity function N, N 
satisfies KB iff N;::: Nxs-
More generally, the minimum specificity closure could 
be extended to any logic L satisfying the property 
(P3). Applying the principle of minimum specificity 
enables us to draw conclusions that taking into account 
the uncertainty and the inconsistency of the knowledge 
base. We propose the following definition of a conse­
quence relation: 
Definition: K B f--- '1/J iff Nxs(.,P) > Nxs(-.'1/!0). 
Proposition 18: KB f--- 'rP iff Nxs(t/;) > Nxs(-,'!j!). 
Intuitively, we deduce '1/J from K B iff the certainty of 
'1/J is higher than the inconsistency inherent to '1/J, or 
equivalently, iff the certainty of 'lj; is higher than the 
certainty of •¢. The binary version of f--- would be 
defined by if' f'--KB '1/J iff Nxs(t.p -+ ¢) > Nxs(l;? -+ 
•if0), or equivalently iff Nxs(t.p--+ ¢) > Nxs(IP -+ 
-,'CjJ). Note that f-- is nonmonotonic; a more complete 
study of the properties of f--- a Ia Kraus, Lehmann 
and Magidor [KLM 90], is possible with respect to the 
(monotonic) logic cl instead of classical logic. 
Note that when N collapses to a classical necessity 
measure, we haveVt/;Nx8(-.,P0) = N(..L) and f--- is the 
classical possibilistic consequence relation [DP 91 b]. 
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Example (multi-source reasoning): let us return to 
the example of Section 3.1.  Taking some a E (0, 1 ) : 
• W1 (witness 1): 
N(female) = 1; N(brown) = 1; N(BMW) = a; 
N(Chanel) = a  ; N(glasses) = u:. 
• W2 (witness 2): 
N(female) = 1; N(-.brown) = 1; N(-.BMW) =a; 
N(-. glasses)= 1. 
The fusion K B of these two knowledge bases gives the 
following minimum specificity closure: 
• NKB(female) = 1; NKB(-.female) = 0; 
NxB(-.female0) = 0; 
• NxB(brown) = 1; NKs(-.brown) = 1; 
NxB(-.brown°) = 1; 
• NxB(BMW) = u:; NxB(-.BMW) =a; 
• NxB(Chanel) =a; NKB(•Chanel) = 0; 
NxB(•Chanel0) = 0; 
• NxB(glasses) = a; NKB(-.glasses) = 1; 
NxB(-.glasses0) = a. 
Therefore, we have K B f--- female, K B f--- Chanel, 
KB f--- -.glasses; however, KB lt- BMW, KB lt- •BMW, 
K B lt- brown, K B lt- -,brown. 
3.3.2 Handling default rules 
Example: Consider the fact penguin and the rules 
� = {penguin---+ bird, penguin---+ •fly, 
bird ---+ fly, bird ---+ wings, 
fly--+ -.live-in-Antarctica}. 
Applying the Z ranking procedure to Ll (written with 
the possibilistic ranking convention) gives the ranking: 
(for any a:, j3 such that 0 < j3 < a < 1) 
Lla = {penguin--+ bird, penguin---+ --,fly, 
fly---+ -.live-in-Antarctica}; 
�f3 = {bird ---+ fly, bird ---+ wings}. 
Then, taking the C1-minimum specificity closure of 
K B = {penguin} U � leads to 
• NxB(penguin) = 1; 
• NxB(bird) = u:; 
NxB(•fly) =a; 
NKB(fly--+ •live-in-Antarctica) =a; 
• NxB(fly) = /3; 
NxB(•fly0) = /3; 
NxB(wings) = j3; 
NxB(-.live-in-Antarctica) = /3; 
• NKB(-.bird) = 0; 
NxB(-.bird0) = 0; 
NxB(-.penguin) = 0; 
NxB(--,penguin°) = 0; 
NxB(-.wings) = 0; 
NxB(•wings0) = 0; 
NxB(live-in-Antarctica) = 0; 
NKB(--,live-in-Antarctica0) = 0. 
Therefore, we have 
K B f-- •fly (which is intended); 
K B f--- -,wings (which is intended); 
but also 
f--- avoids the drowning effect, contrarily to 
the classical minimum specificity closure, 
System Z, and similar systems. 
K B f--- •li ve-in-Antarctica 
which is not intended! (Due to N K B (fly) = /3, the 
rule fly--+ •live-in-Antarctica applies). 
Here is a revised definition, more suited to handling 
default rules: 
Definition: Let K B = FULl, where F is a set of 
facts and Ll = {'Pi --+ 1/;i, i = l..n} a set of default 
rules, where each rule is assigned a necessity degree 
corresponding to its Z-ranking. We define 
G0(Ll) =FuLl 
and Vk 2': 0, 
ck+l(Ll) = 
F u {.:p;--+ 1/;; E Gk(Ll) I NGk(f!.)('Pi) > NGk(f!.)(•.:pi)} 
= F u {'Pi--+ 1/;; E Gk{Ll) I Gk(Ll ) r- <:;';}. 
Lastly, let G00(Ll) = n
k
>oGk(Ll). Then Ll f---• 1/; iff 
G00(Ll) r- 1/;. 
-
Example: We apply the usual ranking procedure: 
� = {bird --+ fly, bird ---+ wings, 
penguin ---+ bird, penguin ---+ -.fly, 
fly---+ •live-in-Antarctica}. 
G1(Ll) = {penguin, bird---+ fly, bird--+ wings, 
penguin ---+ bird, penguin --+ --,fly}. 
Clearly, G00(Ll) = G1(6.). Therefore, Ll f---• •fly. 
Also, Ll r-• bird and 6. f---1 wings. Contrastedly, 
Ll �· •live-in-Antarctica. 
4 Conclusion 
We have given some basic results describing what re­
mains and what changes when switching from classi­
cal possibility theory to possibility theory over a non­
classical logic. We have then focused on a case study, 
namely the paraconsistent logic C1, and showed how to 
use it to reason with inconsistent and uncertain infor­
mation. What has been left aside in this paper is the 
other possible applications of possibility theory over 
non-classical logics: first, one could think of applying 
the general results of Section 2 to other non-classical 
logics: for instance, introducing possibility and ne­
cessity valuations into intuitionistic logic could model 
gradual strengths of proofs; or, introducing them to 
Kleene's logic (or more generally to a multi-valued 
logic) would enable us to handle both uncertainty and 
partial truth. 
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Another topic for further research would be a parallel 
study for other numerical theories of uncertainty. For 
instance, paraconsistent probabilities would lead to a 
more quantitative framework for reasoning with un­
certain and conflictual information; in this framework, 
noticing that Prob( <p) + Prob( -.�.p) = Prob( <p v -,<p) + 
Prob( <pi\ -.�.p) = 1 + Prob( -.�.p0), relaxing the constraint 
Prob( -.�.p0) = 0 would make Prob( <p) + Prob( -.�.p) > 1 
possible for some formulas; then one could think of 
searching for the "least inconsistent" probability dis­
tribution satisfying a set of constraints, which could be 
useful for instance when rectifying a set of inconsistent 
probabilistic data. 
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